2001Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Conflict of Law by Daly, Michael J.
Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 8
Spring 2002
2001Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Conflict
of Law
Michael J. Daly
Roger Williams University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
This Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daly, Michael J. (2002) "2001Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Conflict of Law," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 7: Iss. 2,
Article 8.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol7/iss2/8
418 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:403
Conflict of Laws. Najarian v. National Amusements, Inc., 768
A.2d 1253 (R.I. 2001). In personal injury actions, the law of the
state where the injury occurs determines the rights and responsi-
bilities of the parties unless the law of another state has a more
significant relationship to the issue.
FACTS AN-D TRAVEL
In July, 1994, Hope L. Andersen (Andersen), a resident of East
Providence, Rhode Island, went to the Showcase Cinema in Seek-
onk, Massachusetts with her sister and brother-in-law to see a
matinee movie.1 The group purchased their tickets and proceeded
to the theatre in which their movie was showing. When the group
arrived at the theatre, Andersen looked in and "was amazed at the
utter darkness."2 The group stepped into the theatre and Ander-
sen moved to a small standing room area to her left while her
brother-in-law searched the theatre for vacant seats.3 Shortly
thereafter, as Andersen was about to proceed to a group of empty
seats that her brother-in-law had located, she attempted to steady
herself by leaning on a wall that she mistakenly thought was to
her left. There being no wall where she thought there was one,
Andersen fell to the ground and broke her hip and left elbow.4
Andersen filed a negligence suit against National Amuse-
ments, Inc. and Showcase Cinemas 1-10 (collectively, Showcase) in
Rhode Island Superior Court.5 Andersen alleged that Showcase
failed to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe manner
thereby causing her fall and injury.6 Specifically, Andersen al-
leged that Showcase was negligent in failing to provide adequate
lighting, adequate signs and personnel to assist patrons entering
the theatre. 7
Prior to trial, Showcase filed a motion in limine seeking to ap-
ply Massachusetts law to the case.8 Under Massachusetts law, re-
1. Najarian v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., 768 A.2d 1253, 1254 (R.I. 2001). An-
dersen died in December 1995 and Carol Najarian, as executrix of Andersen's es-
tate, was substituted as the plaintiff.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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covery would be barred if Andersen's negligence exceeded
Showcase's. 9 Conversely, "Rhode Island applies 'pure' comparative
negligence under which there is no such cut-off limitation to recov-
ery."10 The trial judge denied Showcase's motion and applied
Rhode Island's pure comparative negligence law.1
After trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Showcase forty
percent negligent and Andersen sixty percent negligent. 12 Show-
case appealed for a new trial claiming, among other things, that
the trial judge erred in applying Rhode Island law rather than
Massachusetts law.' 3 The appeal was denied and judgment was
entered accordingly. 14 Thereafter, Showcase appealed to the su-
preme court.' 5
BACKGROUND
Rhode Island courts apply an "interest-weighing" approach in
deciding choice of law questions.' 6 Under this approach, a court
looks to the particular facts and applies the law of the state that
bears the most significant relationship to the event and the par-
ties. 17 In personal injury actions, the law of the state where the
injury occurs determines the rights and responsibilities of the par-
ties unless the law of another state has a more significant relation-
ship to the issue.18 Factors relevant to that inquiry are "(1)
predictability of result; (2) maintenance of interstate and interna-
tional order; (3) simplifcation of the judicial task; (4) advancement
of the forum's governmental interests; and (5) application of the
better rule of law." 19 In applying these factors to tort cases, con-
tacts to be considered are "' (a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
9. Id. (citing Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, § 85 (West 2000)).
10. Id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-20-4 (2001)).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1254-55.
14. See id. at 1255 (vacating the judgment of the superior court).
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917, 923 (R.I. 1968)).
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting Blais v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 526 A.2d 854, 856-57 (R.I.
1987) (quoting Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 146)).
19. Id. (quoting Pardey v. Boulevard Billiard Club, 518 A.2d 1349, 1351 (R.I.
1986)).
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business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if
any, between the parties is centered. '"'20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The supreme court applied the above listed factors when it
considered the choice of law question presented by Showcase. Al-
though Andersen was a Rhode Island domiciliary and Showcase
both advertised and registered as a foreign corporation in Rhode
Island, the court held that Massachusetts had the most significant
interest in this case. 21 The injury and alleged negligent conduct
causing the injury occurred in Massachusetts. The relationship
between Andersen and Showcase was entered into in Massachu-
setts. The headquarters of National Amusements and the place of
business at issue were Massachusetts. Moreover, the parties
might reasonably have expected Massachusetts law to apply to an
injury that occurred at a Massachusetts movie theatre. 22 Further,
Massachusetts has a significant interest in regulating premises li-
ability for Massachusetts premises. 23 Thus, concerns with predict-
ability and maintenance of interstate order weigh in favor of
Massachusetts. 24 Accordingly, the trial judge erred in applying
Rhode Island law rather than Massachusetts law. 25
Because Massachusetts law denies recovery in personal injury
cases where the plaintiffs negligence exceeds the defendant's neg-
ligence, as was found in this case, the supreme court vacated the
judgment of the superior court and the case was remanded with
instructions to enter judgment for defendant based on the applica-
tion of Massachusetts law. 26
CONCLUSION
In personal injury actions, the applicable substantive law is
determined by location where the injury occurred unless there are
other factors showing that the laws of another state have a more
20. Id. (quoting Brown v. Church of the Holy Name of Jesus, 252 A.2d 176, at
179 (R.I. 1969) (quoting Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 145(2) (1971))).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (citing Pardey, 518 A.2d at 1351).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1255-56.
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significant relationship to the issues. In Najarian, Rhode Island
law did not bear a significant relationship to the issues such that
its application was required. Rather, concerns with predictability
and maintenance of interstate order called for the application of
Massachusetts law.
Michael J. Daly
